Finding an object in our environment is an important human ability that also represents a critical component of human foraging behavior. One type of information that aids efficient large-scale search is the likelihood of the object being in one location over another. In this study we investigated the conditions under which individuals respond to this likelihood, and the reference frames in which this information is coded, using a novel, large-scale environmental search paradigm. Participants searched an array of locations, on the floor of a room, for a hidden target by pressing switches at each location. We manipulated the probability of the target being at a particular set of locations. Participants reliably learned target likelihoods when the possible search locations were kept constant throughout the experiment and the starting location was fixed. There was no evidence of such learning when room-based and body-based reference frames were dissociated. However, when this was combined with a more salient perceptual landmark, an allocentric cuing effect was observed. These data suggest that the encoding of this type of statistical contingency depends on the combination of spatial cues.
Large-scale search of the environment is an intrinsic part of everyday human behavior. It has been a selective force in our evolution, and the slow growth and extended juvenility of humans are directly linked by some theorists to the large amount of learning-based knowledge that is necessary for effective foraging (Bock, 2004; Kaplan, Lancaster, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000) . Foraging is also an important explanatory behavior in contemporary anthropological study (e.g., Blurton Jones, 1993; Hill & Hurtado, 1996) : Subsistence ecologies are only around 10,000 years old, and many societies still depend on hunting and gathering for their survival. The analysis of search mechanisms is one of the keystones of ethology, and the foraging behavior of nonhuman animals has been modeled using factors such as traveling time, predation risk, and resource distribution (see Krebs & Davies, 1993) . Similar analyses have been applied in human subsistence studies, especially because of the primacy of plant foods in the diets of hunter-gatherers (or "gatherer-hunters"; Bender & Morris, 1988) . Although factors such as predation risk might be less important in the characterization of human foraging behavior, the distribution of resources has a particular impact. Resources do not necessarily occur evenly across space, and so foragers are faced with decisions about where in the environment to direct their efforts. This is the main assumption of the patch-choice model, which was designed to predict which patches of food resource will be searched in a given foray (Charnov, 1976; Kelly, 1995) . The model suggests that foragers apply their knowledge of the environment to balance the value of one resource against that of another. It has also been suggested that the ability to predict the environment is not constant, and so foragers make predictions on a probabilistic basis, directing their search according to the perceived likelihood of success (Kelly, 1995) .
Outside of anthropological research, the spatial statistics of an environment inform search for all forms of target in daily life. This is because, like food resources, the great majority of objects in the world will rarely be randomly distributed; their spatial location is probabilistically defined (Biederman, 1972; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1998; Neider & Zelinsky, 2006) . For example, one is most likely to find a fork in the kitchen rather than the bedroom, whereas an apple could be in a tree or a fruit bowl, depending on the environment. Efficient exploration requires sensitivity to these properties of the surroundings, so that less time and resources are wasted searching for items at locations in which they are unlikely to appear. This process has been widely studied in animal behavior, in circumstances in which the organism matches its inspection of two locations to the expected proportions of food income (e.g., Gallistel et al., 2007; Greggers & Mauelshagen, 1997) , but little work has been carried out in the area of human environmental search in psychology.
A number of visual search studies, in which human participants typically detect the presence or absence of a visually defined target among distractor items, have shown that individuals can detect and respond to statistical regularities of target location and are more efficient at detecting items in high-probability locations (e.g., Baker, Olson, & Behrmann, 2004; Kingstone & Klein, 1991; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996; Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006) . One such example is the contextual cuing effect, reported by Chun and Jiang (1998) . In their study, the distractor configuration was repeated at intervals throughout the experiment. Although participants were unaware of this repetition and its ability to predict the target location, they were significantly faster at locating targets in the same distractor configuration than in different configurations. Spatial probability was more explicitly studied by Geng and Behrmann (2002) in a paradigm that associated the target, over time, with a particular side of the visual display on a computer screen. In their paradigm, an equal number of items appeared on either side of the midline. Over the course of the search experiment, the target appeared with 80% probability on one side of the display. In conditions with this probability manipulation, participants were significantly faster at locating the target when it was in the rich side of space. As in the Chun and Jiang study, participants were not aware of the probabilistic contingencies or their utilization of these contingencies in the search task. Further experiments (Geng & Behrmann, 2005) compared spatial regularity to other visual attention paradigms (e.g., explicit cues; Posner, 1980) and found that probabilistic cuing effects were qualitatively different from other forms of attentional cuing.
There has been some debate as to the functional bases of probabilistic cuing. Geng and Behrmann (2002) suggested that the effect may be based at the oculomotor level, with a facilitation or priming of saccade programs (in the superior colliculus) to the rich side of space. In contrast, a study by Walthew and Gilchrist (2006) , in which saccades were the dependent measure, suggested that the effect is not due to statistical learning but rather is a result of the more transient process of repetition priming (cf. Maljkovic & Nakayama, 2000) . When Walthew and Gilchrist constrained the randomization of target position across trials, so that the target did not fall in the same location within four trials, the probability facilitation that they had previously observed disappeared. However, Geng and Behrmann (2005) argued against a repetition priming interpretation of the probability cuing effect. Although they observed repetition priming for locations in both the rich and the sparse side of the display, there was greater sensitivity to those repetitions in the rich side of space, suggesting facilitation for items in the probable region beyond simple priming.
A more fundamental question is whether the probability cuing effect extends beyond a computer-screen-based visual search paradigm. This question is important because it has been argued that visual search experiments represent a controlled context with which to measure foraging behavior (Klein & MacInnes, 1999; Wolfe, 1994) . One would therefore predict that individuals should benefit from a similar probabilistic cuing mechanism in a largescale search context. More generally, it would seem that if mechanisms observed in visual search tasks do transfer to large-scale space, sensitivity to probable spatial locations should be observable in full-body egocentric search profiles. There is, however, reason to be cautious about the relationship between visual search and large-scale search (or "foraging"). First, in visual search tasks participants are typically seated before the search space presented on a small computer screen, in the vertical plane. In comparison, large-scale search places the individual within the search space, and the egocentric view of the surroundings changes with the movement of the viewer. This means that individuals likely code the space using different frames of reference, especially when they are moving through a large-scale environment. Second, the effort required to search the environment is greater in a large-scale context, and it has been argued that this could result in a better memory for locations already visited in the array (Gilchrist, North, & Hood, 2001; Ruddle & Lessels, 2006) . It is therefore unclear if similar search mechanisms are common across spatial scales.
In the present study we investigated two key issues. First, we sought to examine whether individuals were sensitive to spatial probability in a large-scale search task. Second, we studied how this behavior might relate to spatial reference frames. Exploration of a three-dimensional environment requires a greater degree of interaction between allocentric and egocentric coordinates than do traditional visual search tasks, not least because the retinal view of the search space changes with every step taken in the environment and therefore needs to be aligned to that space. Previous studies of probability cuing have focused on the visual search task, so there has been little discussion about the reference frames that may be used to represent statistical information about the environment. Geng and Behrmann (2002) suggested that the effect they observed may take place at an oculomotor level, which would suggest an egocentric basis to cuing. On the other hand, memory for spatial features of a large environment has been shown to depend on the interaction between egocentric and allocentric representations of space (Burgess, 2006; Mou, McNamara, Valiquette, & Rump, 2004; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Vidal, Amorim, & Berthoz, 2004) . We therefore studied whether probability cuing depends on a combination of reference frames or can operate in one frame alone.
The experiments took place in a novel automated search laboratory, with lights and switches embedded in the floor. The possible search locations were defined by a ring of illuminated lightemitting diodes (see Figure 1) , and participants "inspected" each location in search of a hidden target by activating the switch at that location. The target was found when pressing the switch led to a change in the color of the light. Within the room we employed a fixed spatial probability distribution: Targets appeared with 80% probability in one half of the room and with 20% probability in the other. Over a series of experiments we explored the conditions that lead to a spatial cuing effect in a large-scale environment and studied how this effect is related to spatial reference frames and perceptual features of the array.
General Method
All experiments were conducted in the large-scale search laboratory, an earlier version of which was described by Smith, Gilchrist, and Hood (2005) . Design and procedure followed the same basic structure in each experiment, and key manipulations are separately and respectively described.
Apparatus
The laboratory took the form of an isolated room, measuring 4 ϫ 4 m, with a raised platform floor. Embedded in the floor were 49 search locations, arranged in a concentric octagonal structure (see Figure 1A) . Each location consisted of a circular stainless steel switch (2.5-cm diameter) surrounded by an annulus (6-cm diameter) of light-emitting diodes (see Figure 1B ). Diodes could be illuminated green, red, or orange. The floor was otherwise carpeted in a featureless grayscale noise pattern. Around the array was a curtain rail, from which hung dark blue, featureless curtains, without apparent breaks. Room lighting came from four dimmable units on the ceiling, which were obscured by semiopaque white material. The room was therefore devoid of obvious landmarks, and the entrance to the room was sealed so that all sides of the room appeared identical to participants. The experimenter was seated in an annex to the laboratory containing the computers that powered and controlled the stimulus array. The location and timing (with millisecond accuracy) of each button press and light-emitting diode was recorded. Participants were observed by the experimenter via a hidden closed-circuit television camera mounted in the laboratory.
Design
There were 16 search locations illuminated in each trial. Locations along (or directly adjacent to) the midline of the room or within arm's reach of the starting position were not used, leaving 30 potential locations (shaded gray in Figure 2 ). There were eight illuminated locations on either side of the midline, and their positions were randomly assigned. Participants were required to search the display for the target, defined as the lit location that changed color when the switch was pressed (all other locations did not change). There was always a target present in the display, and its location was not revealed until the switch at that location had been activated. When displays were static (Experiments 2-6), the target appeared in each of the same illuminated locations across the experiment. A key manipulation in the present study was the likelihood of the target appearing on a given half of the display: On 80% of trials the target was located on one side of the midline. In most experiments this half remained constant throughout, although in Experiment 4 it changed in line with the participant's starting position and in Experiment 6 spatial probability was equally distributed. There were 80 trials in each experiment, and so the target appeared on one side (the "rich" side) for 64 trials and on the other side (the "sparse" side) for 16 trials. Trials were split into two blocks of 40 trials, with an intervening break, and the likelihoods remained equal in both blocks (32 rich trials, 8 sparse trials). The rich side of space (in room-based coordinates) and the side of the participant's body on which it appeared (egocentric left or right from the starting position) were fully counterbalanced.
Participants began each trial from a defined starting position on the perimeter of the display (in an area not used in the search task). In some experiments this location was consistent throughout; in others it was equally assigned to opposite sides of the room. In all experiments, starting positions were denoted by a location illuminated orange at the beginning of the trial. Participants moved to that location and activated the switch in order to begin their search. Once activated, the orange location was extinguished. In experiments where the start point was fixed, its position at the front or back of the room (either end of the midline) was fully counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure
Participants first completed an amended version (Schachter, 2000) of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971 ). There was no statistical effect of handedness on search performance in any of the experiments (cf. Smith et al., 2005) , and so this measure is not discussed further. They were then taken into the laboratory, and the task was explained. Participants were first required to press the switch at the orange starting location to begin the trial, while facing the display with their back to the curtain. They then inspected each of the illuminated locations, by pressing the respective switches, until they located the target (the location at which the light changed color when the switch was activated). Following detection of the target, the starting position for the next trial was illuminated and the next trial began. Participants were informed that a target was always present in the display and they were to find it as quickly as they could; no mention was made of the probability manipulation. In experiments in which the starting position alternated, participants were informed that the starting position could appear at either end of the room. The experimenter remained present during a practice trial and then left the laboratory, sealing the curtain with Velcro so that the entrance was indistinguishable from the rest of the surrounding curtain. Participants completed a block of 40 trials and then exited the laboratory for a rest. After 5 min they returned to the room and completed the second block. Performance was observed at all times in order for the experimenter to trigger the next trial, and participants were fully aware of this. Individuals wore wireless headphones, delivering white noise, throughout the experiment to ensure that search was unaffected by any extraneous sounds (e.g., the computer fans in the adjoining annex). When the experiment had finished, participants were questioned to assess their awareness of the probability manipulation. They were first asked whether they had used a strategy to search for the target. If they did not mention anything relating to the distribution of targets, they were asked if they had a sense of where the target was likely to be. These questions are assumed to tap explicit awareness (see Chun & Jiang, 1998; Weiskrantz, 1990) . Participants who did not refer to the actual manipulation were asked an additional question, "If I told you that the target was more likely to be in one side/color, would you be able to guess which one?" This question in which the participant is forced to guess can indicate partial or implicit awareness (Weiskrantz, 1990) . A full debriefing procedure followed.
Analysis
Three main dependent variables were analyzed in the present experiments. First, the search time for each trial (in seconds, with millisecond accuracy), from activation of the starting position to activation of the target, was recorded. Second, we calculated the side of the display to which the first visit was directed. This was formulated as the percentage of trials that were started in the rich side of the display. Third, we calculated the metric path length of each trial, measured as the total distance (in centimeters) traveled between the locations of each button press. This gives a measure of search efficiency independent of a particular participant's speed. Search times, first visit rates, and path length were all analyzed in a 2 (probability: sparse, rich) ϫ 2 (block: Block 1, Block 2) repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Experiment 1
This first experiment was designed to assess participants' sensitivity to the probability of target location in large-scale space. Possible target locations were equally dispersed on either side of the midline, and participants were required to search these locations serially until they located the target item. Targets appeared with 80% probability in one half of the room and 20% probability in the other.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (12 female, 6 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Individuals were between 18 and 35 years of age (mean age ϭ 20.33 years, SD ϭ 3.77) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. Sixteen items in the search display were illuminated green. On each trial a new array was presented, with items randomly positioned so that there were eight locations on either side of the midline. Across trials, 80% of targets were located in one side of the array (in room-based coordinates). Participants started from the same position throughout the experiment. They were required to activate each location until they found the target, which was defined as the item that changed its color to red when the switch was activated. Once the target had been found, the display was extinguished and the starting position was illuminated. When participants returned to the starting position and activated the switch, a new display, with an alternative set of search locations, was presented, and participants began a new search.
Results
Median search times were marginally faster for targets in the rich side of the display than for those in the sparse side (mean difference ϭ 2.16 s, SD ϭ 5.44), as illustrated in Figure 3 . However, there was no reliable effect of probability, F(1, 17) ϭ 2.99, p ϭ .102, no main effect of block (F Ͻ 1), and no interaction between the two factors (F Ͻ 1). There were more first visits to targets in the rich side (mean difference ϭ 14.86%, SD ϭ 51.98) than to those in the sparse side of the display. These data are illustrated in Figure 4 . However, there was no reliable effect of probability, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.47, p ϭ .242, no main effect of block (F Ͻ 1), and no Probability ϫ Block interaction (F Ͻ 1). Measures of path length showed that participants traveled a greater distance on sparse than on rich trials (mean difference ϭ 150 cm, SD ϭ 305). This difference approached significance, F(1, 17) ϭ 4.35, p ϭ .052, although there was no effect of block (F Ͻ 1) and no Probability ϫ Block interaction (F Ͻ 1). Path length data are illustrated in Figure 5 . When participants were probed for their awareness of the probability manipulation, 50.00% stated an explicit awareness of target likelihoods; this level was not significantly different from chance (binomial p ϭ .91). A further 38.89% of the total selected the correct side when asked to guess which was the rich half, and the remaining 11.11% guessed incorrectly. When the ANOVAs were repeated with awareness (explicit vs. guesses) as a between-subjects factor, there was no effect of awareness on search times (F Ͻ 1) or first visits (F Ͻ 1).
Discussion
Although participants were generally slightly faster to find targets located in the rich side of space, there were more first visits to the rich side of the display, and there was a longer path length for sparse trials, none of these observations reached statistical significance. This is despite the fact that 50% of participants expressed some form of awareness of the probability manipulation when probed after the experiment. These findings suggest that while participants demonstrated some sensitivity to probabilistic properties of the display, their search profiles were not reliably affected by the spatial statistics. It is quite striking that participants did not modulate their search behavior over successive trials in which the target was much more likely to be on one side of the room. However, studies of rodent navigation (e.g., Biegler & Morris, 1993) have shown that spatial learning is dependent upon the stability of landmarks in the arena. It may therefore be the case that robust learning was not found in the current context because a new set of search locations was presented in each trial, reducing the perceived stability of the array and in turn reducing the likelihood that any consistent learning would take place. To test this, in Experiment 2, we presented a stable array across trials.
Experiment 2
If spatial learning depends upon the stability of landmarks in the array, participants should be more likely to be cued by the probability manipulation when the locations in the search array remain fixed throughout the experiment.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (11 female, 7 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Participants were between 18 and 46 years of age (mean age ϭ 20.78 years, SD ϭ 6.44) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. As in Experiment 1, all 16 items in the search display were illuminated green, with eight either side of the midline, and 80% of targets were located in one side of the room. The target item changed its color to red when the switch was activated. In this experiment, however, the array did not change from one trial to the next. Once the target was activated during search, it illuminated red for 2 s and then reverted to green. The starting position was then illuminated and participants began a new trial. Thus, the array remained fixed for the duration of the experiment, and each participant was presented with a different randomized array. The target appeared in each of the illuminated search locations, and 80% of targets were located in one side of the room.
Results
Search times (see Figure 3) were significantly faster for targets in the rich side of the display (mean difference ϭ 6.57 s, SD ϭ 4.22), F(1, 13) ϭ 42.9, p Ͻ .001. There was also a main effect of block, F(1, 9) ϭ 5.73, p Ͻ .05, and a Probability ϫ Block interaction, F(1, 13) ϭ 11.0, p Ͻ .005, reflecting the slower overall search times for sparse trials in the second block and indicating a larger cuing effect in Block 2 (mean difference ϭ 8.10 s, SD ϭ (Loftus & Masson, 1994) . Asterisks denote a statistically significant difference between search times for rich and sparse trials.
4.93) than Block 1 (mean difference ϭ 5.05 s, SD ϭ 4.31). There were significantly more first visits (see Figure 4) to the rich than the sparse side of the display (mean difference ϭ 47.78%, SD ϭ 34.26), F(1, 17) ϭ 34.9, p Ͻ .001. There was no effect of block (F Ͻ 1), although there was a Probability ϫ Block interaction, F(1, 17) ϭ 14.1, p ϭ .005: There were more first visits to the sparse side in Block 1 than in Block 2 (Block 1: mean ϭ 32.08%, SD ϭ 16.74; Block 2: mean ϭ 20.14%, SD ϭ 19.95). Path lengths (see Figure 5 ) were significantly shorter for rich than for sparse trials (mean difference ϭ 311 cm, SD ϭ 204), F(1, 17) ϭ 41.8, p Ͻ .001. There was no effect of block on path length, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.86, p ϭ .190, although there was a Probability ϫ Block interaction, F(1, 17) ϭ 12.9, p ϭ .002: The difference between rich and sparse paths was greater in Block 2 (mean difference ϭ 392 cm, SD ϭ 228) than in Block 1 (mean difference ϭ 229 cm, SD ϭ 222). Of the participants, 88.89% stated an awareness of the probability manipulation; this was significantly greater than chance (binomial p Ͻ .001). The remaining 11.11% correctly guessed the rich side when probed further. To test the effect of display stability directly, we carried out an ANOVA on search times, with experiment as a betweensubjects variable (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) and probability (rich, sparse) as a within-subject variable. There was an overall main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 29.2, p Ͻ .001, no effect of Experiment (F Ͻ 1), and a significant Experiment ϫ Probability interaction, F(1, 34) ϭ 7.16, p Ͻ .02. This analysis demonstrates a reliably greater cuing effect in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
Discussion
In this experiment the array of items remained fixed throughout the trials, with only the target location moving between trials. Participants demonstrated a strong probability cuing effect: They were significantly faster to find the target when it was located in the rich side of the display and significantly more likely to make their first visit to the rich side, and their path length was significantly longer on sparse trials. Participants also made fewer first visits to the sparse side in Block 2 than in Block 1, and their path length became shorter, indicating a strengthening of the cuing effect over time. When participants were probed following the experiment, almost all of them were explicitly aware of the probability manipulation. This experiment demonstrates that probabilistic cuing can occur in large-scale space. Moreover, the findings suggest that, consistent with rodent studies (Biegler & Morris, 1 As a test for any sex differences in these data, an additional six participants were tested to make an equal distribution of men and women (N ϭ 24). There were no between-subjects effects of sex for search time (men: rich M ϭ 6.68 s, SD ϭ 2.32, sparse M ϭ 12.77 s, SD ϭ 3.89; women: rich M ϭ 8.35 s, SD ϭ 2.18, sparse M ϭ 14.51 s, SD 3.83); proportion of first visits to the rich side (men: M ϭ 74.58 %, SD ϭ 20.55; women: M ϭ 72.60 %, SD ϭ 11.99); or path length (men: rich M ϭ 490 cm, SD ϭ 127, sparse M ϭ 827 cm, SD ϭ 139; women: rich M ϭ 538 cm, SD ϭ 75.57, sparse M ϭ 818 cm, SD ϭ 125); for all analyses, F(1, 22) Ͻ 1. Of participants, 91.67% stated an explicit awareness of the probability distribution and the remaining 8.33% guessed correctly when asked. We take these findings as evidence against a strong sex difference in the present paradigm. 1993), spatial learning in humans, in the present context, is influenced by the stability of the array. It would appear that participants are more likely to benefit from statistical regularities of the display when those properties can be associated with stable locations in the world. The findings also indicate that probabilistic cuing can take place in full-body search, as well as at the level of saccade generation (as discussed by Geng & Behrmann, 2002) .
In the experiments that follow, we attempted to address the coordinate frameworks within which large-scale cuing might take place. Spatial reference frames are important in large-scale search because egocentric movement can radically alter the viewpoint of an array. This would imply that efficient large-scale search behavior might rely on a mechanism that characterizes the allocentric, environment-based coding of target probabilities, irrespective of the position of the observer, which most likely changes from moment to moment during search. Biegler and Morris (1993) reported that spatial learning was modulated by landmark stability, irrespective of the rat's position in the arena. Probability cuing in Experiments 1 and 2 appeared to be affected by the stability of the array, which would suggest that learning in the present task was taking place in allocentric (roomcentered) coordinates. We tested this by manipulating the position from which participants began their search on each trial. As a result, the rich side of the display remained constant in room-based coordinates (as indicated by the pattern of the array) but changed position in egocentric (body-based) coordinates. If learning mainly takes place in an allocentric framework, we would expect participants to be cued by the probability manipulation when starting from either end of the room.
Experiment 3

Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (17 female, 1 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Participants were between 18 and 20 years of age (mean age ϭ 19.11 years, SD ϭ 0.83) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. The design was identical to that of Experiment 2, with an array of green search locations that remained fixed throughout the experiment and an 80% probability that the target would appear in one side of the display. In this case, the starting position, rather than being fixed, appeared with equal likelihood at either end of the midline. Therefore, participants started half of the trials from one end of the array and half of the trials from the other end. The order of starting positions was fully randomized.
Results
There was no main effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or block (F Ͻ 1) on search times (see Figure 3 ). There was, however, an interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) ϭ 9.95, p Ͻ .01, reflecting the crossover from a small sparse benefit in Block 1 (mean difference ϭ 0.84 s, SD ϭ 3.93) to a rich benefit in Block 2 (mean difference ϭ 2.96 s, SD ϭ 6.36). For first visits, there was no main effect of probability, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.99, p ϭ .176, or of block (F Ͻ 1) on first visits (see Figure 4) . However, there was a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) ϭ 9.34, p Ͻ .01, reflecting the greater difference between visits to the rich and poor sides in Block 2 than in Block 1: There were more visits to the sparse side in Block 1 (mean ϭ 50.42%, SD ϭ 11.19) and to the rich side in Block 2 (mean ϭ 58.89%, SD ϭ 16.96). For path length (see Figure 5) there was no main effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or of block (F Ͻ 1). An interaction between the two factors approached significance, F(1, 17) ϭ 3.12, p ϭ .095, reflecting a marginal crossover from a small sparse benefit in Block 1 to a rich benefit in Block 2: Path lengths (see Figure 5) were longer for rich trials in Block 1 (mean difference ϭ 4.37 cm, SD ϭ 146) and for sparse trials in Block 2 (mean difference ϭ 97.85 cm, SD ϭ 242). Of participants, 27.78% were explicitly aware of the probability manipulation, which is lower than would be expected by chance (binomial p ϭ .06), and the remaining 72.22% correctly guessed the rich side when probed further.
To test for a difference between observed behaviors in Experiment 3 and Experiment 2, we carried out an ANOVA on search times, with experiment as a between-subjects variable (Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 2) and side (rich, sparse) as a within-subject variable. There was an overall main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 26.4, p Ͻ .001, but no reliable effect of experiment (F Ͻ 1). A significant Experiment ϫ Probability interaction, F(1, 34) ϭ 13.7, p ϭ .01, demonstrated a reliably larger cuing effect in Experiment 2.
Discussion
When the starting position was manipulated so that participants began their search at different sides of the room, there was no reliable effect of the probability manipulation on search times or first visits. However, there was an interaction between the block and some indices of search behavior: In Block 2, participants were generally faster to locate rich targets and more likely to start in the rich side. It therefore seems that although there was some evidence of learning in the second block, there was not an overall effect of probability on search behavior. There appeared to be a very slight benefit for sparse targets in Block 1, which suggests that some participants may have been utilizing some form of erroneous strategy in the earlier trials. Overall, these results suggest that the probabilistic cuing effect observed in Experiment 2 was not primarily based on allocentric coordinates, because when the allocentric information was held constant across Experiments 2 and 3, but the egocentric information was manipulated, this had a reliable effect on performance. The interactions with block indicate that a degree of learning may have taken place, although this was not sufficient or did not occur early enough in the block to reliably affect search behavior. This effect is also reflected in the lower number of awareness reports following testing. An alternative explanation for the learning effect in Experiment 2 is, therefore, that probability cuing primarily takes place in egocentric coordinates, and this possibility was tested in Experiment 4.
Experiment 4
The cuing effect observed in Experiment 2, rather than solely occurring in room-based coordinates, may have been based in egocentric coordinates: Participants could have associated spatial probability with a particular side of their body. As they were facing the display from the same position at the beginning of each trial, they may therefore have learned to move in a particular direction from that starting point. This would mean that, irrespective of position, participants learn in a viewpoint-based framework. By manipulating the laterality of the rich side of the display, as well as the starting position, we next tested whether participants could learn about statistical regularities with reference to an egocentric coordinate framework.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (11 female, 7 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Participants were between 18 and 28 years of age (mean age ϭ 19.50 years, SD ϭ 2.31) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. The basic design was the same as that of Experiment 3: The array was fixed throughout the experiment, and participants started their search at either end of the midline, with equal likelihood. Targets appeared with 80% probability on one side of the participant's body, irrespective of the starting position. Therefore a participant might have 64 trials with the target to the right (rich side) and 16 trials with it to the left (sparse side). In this case, the rich side of space was no longer fixed in room-based coordinates but rather moved along with the starting position, so that it was more likely to correspond to one side of the participant's egocentric view. The rich side of the body was counterbalanced across participants.
Results
For median search times (see Figure 3) , there was no main effect of probability (F Ͼ 1) or of block, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.67, p ϭ .213, and there was no interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) ϭ 2.86, p ϭ .109. For first visits (see Figure 4) , there was no main effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or of block (F Ͻ 1) and no interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.30, p ϭ .269. For path length (see Figure 5) , there was no main effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or of block, F(1, 17) ϭ 2.21, p ϭ .156. An interaction between the two factors approached significance, F(1, 17) ϭ 3.19, p ϭ .092, reflecting a marginal crossover from a small sparse benefit in Block 1 (mean difference ϭ 42.38 cm, SD ϭ 165) to a rich benefit in Block 2 (mean difference ϭ 72.67 cm, SD ϭ 250). Of participants, 5.56% were explicitly aware of the probability manipulation, which is significantly lower than chance (binomial p Ͻ .001); 50.00% provided a correct guess when probed further about which side of their body was more likely to contain a target; and 44.44% guessed incorrectly.
To compare the behavior observed in this experiment with that of Experiment 2, we conducted an ANOVA on search times, with experiment as a between-subjects variable (Experiment 4 vs. Experiment 2) and side (rich, sparse) as a within-subject variable. There was an overall main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 23.9, p Ͻ .001, but no reliable effect of experiment (F Ͻ 1). There was, however, a significant Experiment ϫ Probability interaction, F(1, 34) ϭ 16.1, p Ͻ .001, showing a reliably greater cuing effect in Experiment 2.
Discussion
Large-scale probabilistic cuing does not seem to be based solely in egocentric coordinates: participants did not consistently learn that the target was more likely to be on one side of their body. There was also a greater number of incorrect guesses when participants were probed for awareness, which suggests lower sensitivity to the probability manipulation than in the other experiments. It could be argued that the task was not performed on a solely egocentric basis: Target locations in the array were randomly assigned and thus provided landmarks that distinguished each half. Furthermore, participants likely updated their representation of position in absolute space through body movements (Gopal, Klatzky, & Smith, 1989) . However, the side to which participants were cued was based on their egocentric framework, irrespective of their position in the room. Participants seemed unable to learn that efficient search for the target was predominantly associated with movement in the same direction.
In Experiment 2 we found robust evidence for cuing when both allocentric and egocentric information supported the cuing. This cuing effect was reliably modulated when either the egocentric (Experiment 3) or allocentric (Experiment 4) basis was removed. In both of these experiments one of these cues alone was not enough to produce a statistically reliable difference between the sparse and rich locations. There are a number of ways to account for the combined findings of Experiments 2, 3, and 4. For example, robust probabilistic cuing might depend on an additive combination of allocentric and egocentric bases (i.e., Lourenco, Huttenlocher, & Vasilyeva, 2005; Shelton & McNamara, 2001; Vidal et al., 2004) . In Experiment 2, participants were cued to a space that remained stable in both room-based and body-based coordinates. In comparison, there was a mismatch between these frameworks in Experiments 3 and 4, and this may have attenuated or even obliterated learning. Alternatively, cuing could be disrupted by changing one's starting position. It has been argued that contextual cuing effects (Chun & Jiang, 1998) are viewpoint dependent (Chua & Chun, 2003) , and so the modulation of starting position here could preclude cuing (although see Zhao, Zhou, Mou, Hayward, & Owen, 2007) . Both of these potential explanations converge on the prediction that participants will be less likely to learn about the probabilistic contingencies when they start their searches from more than one position. Another related suggestion is that participants do not distinguish the two halves of the display by their visual properties (i.e., the arrangement of items in each half). As a result, they may not conceive of the display as being composed of two portions and therefore could be less likely to assign some form of preferential or statistical weighting to one side in favor of the other. The predicted result of this reasoning is that the inclusion of some form of landmark or feature that would more clearly disambiguate each half of the display would improve the chances of a cuing effect. If so, this would also imply that multiple starting points are not solely responsible for the absence of probabilistic cuing.
Experiment 5
As a means of clearly distinguishing one half of the display from the other, items on one side of the midline were illuminated green and items on the other side were illuminated red. The task parameters were otherwise identical to those in Experiment 3, in which we tested whether there was an allocentric basis to the learning effect demonstrated in Experiment 2.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (16 female, 2 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Participants were between 18 and 25 years of age (mean age ϭ 20.17 years, SD ϭ 1.92) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. The design was the same as that of Experiment 3: The array was fixed throughout the experiment, and the target appeared with 80% probability in one side of the array (in room-based coordinates). Participants started their search at either end of the midline. In this experiment, one half of the display was illuminated red and the other half was illuminated green; these colors were fixed throughout the experiment, and the side on which the colors appeared was counterbalanced. As a result, targets appeared with 80% probability in one side of the display and in a particular color (which was also counterbalanced). Targets were defined as the item that changed color when activated: If the target was in the green half, it illuminated red and vice versa.
Results
Participants were significantly faster (see Figure 3) at locating the target when it appeared in the rich side of the room (mean difference ϭ 3.11 s, SD ϭ 4.87), F(1, 17) ϭ 6.84, p Ͻ .02. There was no effect of block on search times (F Ͻ 1) and no Probability ϫ Block interaction (F Ͻ 1). Participants made significantly more first visits (see Figure 4) to the rich side of space (mean difference ϭ 25.76%, SD ϭ 36.21), F(1, 17) ϭ 9.11, p Ͻ .01. There was no effect of block on first visits (F ϭ 1) and no Probability ϫ Block interaction, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.04, p ϭ .323. Path lengths (see Figure 5) were significantly shorter for rich trials (mean difference ϭ 167 cm, SD ϭ 243), F(1, 17) ϭ 8.49, p ϭ .01. There was a main effect of block, F(1, 17) ϭ 6.12, p Ͻ .05, with shorter overall path lengths in Block 2 (mean length ϭ 681 cm, SD ϭ 131) than in Block 1 (mean length ϭ 637 cm, SD ϭ 104), and there was no interaction between the two factors, F(1, 17) ϭ 1.36, p ϭ .260. Of participants, 55.56% were explicitly aware of the probability manipulation, a further 38.89% provided a correct guess when probed about which side of their body was more likely to contain a target, and 5.56% guessed incorrectly. The number of participants explicitly reporting the probability distribution was at chance level (binomial p ϭ .65).
To compare the behavior observed in this experiment with that of Experiment 2, we conducted an ANOVA on search times, with experiment (Experiment 5 vs. Experiment 2) as a between-subjects variable and side (rich, sparse) as a within-subject variable. There was an overall main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 39.1, p Ͻ .001, but no reliable effect of experiment (F Ͻ 1). There was, however, an interaction between factors, F(1, 34) ϭ 5.19, p Ͻ .05. This suggests that although both experiments demonstrated a reliable cuing effect, it was stronger in Experiment 2 than it was in Experiment 5.
Discussion
When the rich side of space was associated with a cue (i.e., color) that distinguished it from the poor side, participants demonstrated a probability cuing effect. This is despite the fact that they started trials from either end of the midline. These findings therefore demonstrate that learning is not solely dependent on a fixed viewpoint. They also show that learning can take place in room-based allocentric coordinates when there are additional sources of information present. In these circumstances it appears that the rich side of space required a simple landmark or cue association in order to become salient to the individual (at either an implicit or an explicit level). Perhaps color acts as a stable feature, similar to a landmark (Biegler & Morris, 1993) , which participants can utilize in order to learn about spatial properties of the display. The spatial arrangement of items alone may not have been salient enough to be utilized by participants, and color may therefore have acted as a more fundamental means for disambiguating parts of space in the display. An alternative explanation is that participants were simply associating target probability with a color, independent of the spatial probability manipulation. This would still be a case of probabilistic cuing but would differ from the coordinate distinctions that we have been attempting to dissociate here. This possibility was tested in the final experiment.
Experiment 6
By removing the spatial element of probability manipulation and associating targets with only a color cue, we examined whether the learning effect observed in Experiment 5 was based in a simple target-color association or whether cuing requires a spatial probability component.
Method
Participants. Eighteen undergraduates (12 female, 6 male) from the University of Bristol participated for course credit. Participants were between 18 and 22 years of age (mean ϭ 19.44 years, SD ϭ 1.15) and were physically able to walk around and inspect items in the search space.
Design. In this experiment, one half of the display was illuminated red and the other half was illuminated green. As in Experiments 2-5, the physical location of items in the array was fixed, although in this experiment the colors could alternate so that it was possible for the red half and the green half to swap sides. As a result, colors were equally distributed across space, with each color appearing on each side of the array 50% of the time. Targets appeared with 80% probability in one of the colors, and the color with which this probability was associated was counterbalanced. As in Experiment 5, targets were defined as the item that changed color when activated. Participants started their search at either end of the midline with equal frequency.
Results
Search times (see Figure 3) were marginally faster for rich targets than for sparse targets (mean difference ϭ 1.30 s, SD ϭ 3.38). There was, however, no main effect of probability, F(1, 17) ϭ 2.95, p ϭ .104, or block (F Ͻ 1) on search times and no interaction between the two factors (F Ͻ 1). There were marginally more first visits (see Figure 4) to the rich color than to the sparse color (mean difference ϭ 4.58%, SD ϭ 19.54). However, there was no main effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or block (F Ͻ 1) and no interaction between the two factors (F Ͻ 1). Path length (see Figure 5 ) was slightly longer for sparse trials (mean difference ϭ 33.02 cm, SD ϭ 147), although there was no significant effect of probability (F Ͻ 1) or block (F Ͻ 1) and no Probability ϫ Block interaction (F Ͻ 1). Of participants, 11.11% were explicitly aware of the probability manipulation, which is significantly below levels predicted by chance (binomial p ϭ .001). A further 66.67% correctly guessed the rich side when probed further, and 22.22% guessed incorrectly.
To compare the behavior observed in this experiment with that observed in Experiment 5, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on search times, with probability (rich vs. sparse) as a within-subjects factor and experiment (Experiment 5 vs. Experiment 6) as a between-subjects factor. There was an overall main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 9.77, p Ͻ .005, but no reliable effect of experiment (F Ͻ 1) and no interaction between factors, F(1, 34) ϭ 1.26, p ϭ .269. We also conducted a comparison with Experiment 2, which revealed a main effect of probability, F(1, 34) ϭ 37.6, p Ͻ .001, no effect of experiment, F(1, 34) ϭ 1.05, p ϭ .312, and a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 34) ϭ 15.4, p Ͻ .001. Although the difference between Experiments 5 and 6 is not strong enough to lead to an interaction in the between-subjects comparison across experiments, this comparison is reliable between Experiments 2 and 6. Along with the main effect of probability within Experiments 2 and 5 and the lack of such an effect in Experiment 6, these results provide some support for the suggestion that the effect of probability was attenuated in this final experiment.
Discussion
As a test of whether participants were cued by color alone in Experiment 5, targets were equally distributed across space but were more likely to be associated with one of the two colors. Participants appeared not to be sensitive to this manipulation, as there was no reliable cuing effect for search times, first visits, or path length. This suggests that color alone may not be sufficient for participants to learn the probability of target location. It therefore seems that a spatial component may be necessary to produce the effect observed in Experiment 5. However, this conclusion must be treated with caution because of the lack of a Probability ϫ Experiment interaction when Experiments 5 and 6 were compared.
General Discussion
Over a series of experiments we examined whether humans are sensitive to spatial regularities in large-scale environmental search. One would expect an ability to predict the likely location of a given object to be a key property of foraging-like behavior (Kelly, 1995) . Previous studies utilizing the more conventional visual search paradigm have established that participants are able to learn about statistical properties of the display and to utilize that information to search with greater efficiency. In the present context, participants were situated within the space that they were searching and inspected locations by physically moving around the environment. By manipulating perceptual and probabilistic prop-erties of the display, along with the participant's position within space, we have attempted to establish a means to address the mechanisms by which individuals learn about target probabilities in the environment around them and the reference frames within which that information is represented.
The basic paradigm was introduced in Experiment 1, in which participants inspected illuminated locations until they activated the hidden target. On 80% of trials the target appeared on one side of the display. Once the target had been located, the locations were extinguished and a new display was presented. Under these circumstances, although participants demonstrated some degree of preference for the rich side of space, there was no reliable affect of probability on search behavior. In contrast, when the items remained fixed throughout the experiment, in Experiment 2, participants showed a strong learning effect, with faster search times to targets located in the rich side, a greater proportion of first visits to that side, and longer path lengths on sparse trials. It therefore seems that a stable array is much more likely to engender probability cuing in a large-scale context.
It is interesting to compare the current findings with those of Geng and Behrmann (2002) , who reported a reliable cuing effect in a conventional computer-based visual search paradigm in which the positions of items changed in every trial (within a constrained set of possible locations). In comparison, later work from the same laboratory (Geng & Behrmann, 2005) utilized a paradigm in which the physical locations of items in the display were fixed. Although learning effects were quantitatively and qualitatively equivalent across these paradigms, the present findings suggest that this may not be the same for large-scale search. The difference here could arise from a greater requirement to integrate allocentric and egocentric frames of reference in large-scale search, owing to the updating of spatial position as the observer moves within the array (Burgess, 2006; Gopal et al., 1989) . Of course, an immediate comparison with the Geng and Behrmann (2002) visual search paradigm (which the present paradigm most closely resembles) is not possible, especially as that experiment was not run with fixed item locations. It may therefore be the case that a stronger cuing effect would have been found had the array remained stable throughout the experiment. Furthermore, it is not possible to test participants with as many trials in the current paradigm, and so we do not know if participants could have demonstrated a significant cuing effect in Experiment 1 if they had performed a number of trials similar to that in the Geng and Behrmann (2002) experiment (i.e., 225) . However, the present findings are instructive in that they point toward the processes by which participants might learn about the spatial statistics of their environment within a given window of exploration.
The contribution of reference frames was explicitly tested in Experiments 3 and 4, in which we attempted to disambiguate two forms of spatial coding. In Experiment 3 the starting position of the participant was manipulated so that the target was more likely to appear in one side of the room (an allocentric cue) but was equally likely to appear on either side of the participant's body. Under these circumstances participants did not demonstrate a cuing effect, although interactions with the experimental block suggest that some form of learning was present (yet not sufficient). The converse representation-that probabilities are coded egocentricallywas tested in Experiment 4, in which the likely location of the target was specified with regard to the participant's viewpoint, irrespective of the starting position. Again, no cuing effect was observed in this experiment, which implies that probability was not solely represented in either allocentric or egocentric coordinates. Rather, these findings suggest that a combination of cues is necessary for learning statistical contingencies and that one reference frame alone will not support a cuing effect. This proposal is supported by the findings of Shelton and McNamara (2001) , who suggest that spatial learning of our surroundings is achieved by imposing an environmentally centered reference frame that is based on egocentric experience. Similar arguments have been put forward by Lourenco et al. (2005) , who found that children's learning of object locations was best when observers and objects shared a similar relationship to the surrounding space. In the present study, there were allocentric cues present in Experiment 4: Target location was defined egocentrically, but locations in the display were randomized and were therefore arranged differently on either side of the midline. Although this arrangement could have been used to physically disambiguate the side of the array from which participants started, it seemed not to aid their performance.
The observation that participants did not seem to exploit the physical arrangement of items in the display suggests that participants may not have been distinguishing the two halves of the array by their perceptual properties. This may have affected the likelihood that they would associate target probability with a particular side of the array, especially when the starting viewpoint was modulated (see Chua & Chun, 2003) . In Experiment 5 we introduced an additional perceptual feature to distinguish one side of the display from the other, and participants displayed a strong learning effect. This demonstrates that a more obvious form of perceptual cue facilitated probability cuing, irrespective of the starting position. In Experiment 6 we tested whether probability could be associated with the perceptual cue alone, without a spatial component, and found that participants did not display the cuing effect present in Experiment 5, which implies that a spatial component is necessary to produce a cuing effect. These findings show that participants were able to learn about allocentrically defined spatial probabilities when the perceptual properties of the array were more salient. Similar findings have been observed in rodent place-learning tasks (e.g., Save & Poucet, 2000) and developmental studies of spatial reorientation (e.g., Learmonth, Nadel, & Newcombe, 2002; Lee, Shusterman, & Spelke, 2006; Smith et al., 2008) . These findings can be compared with those from studies of statistical learning in the visual search paradigm, where cuing has been demonstrated for perceptual properties of the array, independent from spatial position (e.g., Baker et al., 2004; Turk-Browne, Jungé, & Scholl, 2005) . Perhaps a task that requires egocentric movement through the search array dictates that contingencies be attached to spatial properties of the scene.
Although it has been argued that the visual search paradigm represents a controlled model of foraging behavior (e.g., Klein & MacInnes, 1999; Wolfe, 1994) , the present findings suggest that processes operating in small-scale space may not necessarily extend directly to large-scale contexts. For example, the physical and spatial demands of moving through the active space might result in a task context that relies on properties of the world alternative or additional to those that are addressed in traditional visual search paradigms (Gilchrist et al., 2001; Ruddle & Lessels, 2006; Smith et al., 2005) . We have found, in terms of statistical learning, that probabilistic cuing can take place in a large-scale context, and we suggest that this mechanism is a crucial component of foraginglike search in the real world. However, in large-scale space this cuing may be more dependent on stable and salient properties of the world. Naturalistic environmental search requires a representation of one's position in space that can be updated and maintained across positions and viewpoints. For this to take place, individuals must exploit properties of the world that remain constant across these movements, and the present study suggests that properties such as a fixed global position and a salient perceptual feature are most likely to be utilized by those forming expectancies about target locations. Properties such as this have proved central to the formation of allocentric cognitive maps (Ekstrom et al., 2003; O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978; Spiers, Burgess, Hartley, VarghaKhadem, & O'Keefe, 2001 ), which we would expect to subserve efficient large-scale search. Such studies have shown this information to be primarily represented in hippocampal brain areas, and we suggest that the hippocampus may be a key neural structure in representing statistical information in the present task, especially given recent demonstrations of its role in transforming place learning into behavior (Bast, Wilson, Witter, & Morris, 2009 ). We can compare this to the suggestion by Geng and Behrmann (2002) that their effect using a computer-based visual search task may have been related to the superior colliculus and the priming of saccadic eye movements (see also Walthew & Gilchrist, 2006) . Although this area may be a potential candidate for the coding of statistics in a visual search task, we must assume that cuing operated at a higher level in the present task, as it guided full-body movements into extrapersonal space.
A key area in which the present findings differ from those of other studies of statistical learning (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1998; Geng & Behrmann, 2002 Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1996) is in conscious awareness of the cuing manipulation. Previous computer-based visual search studies have found that participants do not report noticing the distribution of targets when probed after an experiment and are unaware of their use of that distribution to guide their search behavior. In contrast, successful learning in the present experiments was associated with a more explicit level of awareness: A higher percentage of participants spontaneously commented on the probabilistic manipulation in Experiments 2 and 5, the two contexts in which a cuing effect was observed. The difference is likely due to the greater degree of movement and effort required for searching large-scale space, compared to a visual search task. Perhaps cuing of this kind is dependent on awareness of the probabilistic distribution and thus accounts for the absence of learning in experiments in which the manipulation was less salient or apparent. Experiments by Brockmole and Henderson (2006) have shown that participants can demonstrate explicit awareness of contextual cuing in a structured environment, which further suggests that these processes might differ in a more ecologically valid context, compared to traditional visual search displays. A note of caution should perhaps be raised about the means for gauging awareness here, as the process of asking participants about the distribution of targets could have led them to explicitly reason about their responses post hoc, although the reasons for their choices may not have been apparent to them during the experiment. A more sensitive method may therefore be more applicable in future, such as asking participants to make judgments on the basis of test stimuli, as used by Chun and Jiang (1998) .
The experiments reported here represent an initial step in exploiting the potential of the automated large-scale search paradigm. As a result, the environment was purposefully simple and as close to a controlled visual search context as possible. However, future studies might make use of additional environmental cues, such as adding landmarks to the room that are separable from the search array itself. For example, participants may be more likely to learn about allocentrically defined probabilities (i.e., Experiment 3) if there were a single landmark external to the array with which they could orient themselves. Our interpretation of probability cuing, and of the learning of statistical contingencies, was informed by the approach taken in Geng and Behrmann (2002) , in which analysis was based upon overall performance. A useful alternative might be to introduce a paradigm in which there are a larger number of trials arranged in a structure of smaller epochs (akin to Chun & Jiang, 1998) . By this method one could obtain a more sensitive measure of change, or learning, over time. In the present context this possibility could prove to be precluded by the physical demands of the task, and so it may be necessary to use a smaller array size. A final issue that may be worthy of attention is whether there are any sex differences in sensitivity to environmental statistics. Although there were no strong sex differences in the basic cuing effect described in Experiment 2 (see Footnote 1), we cannot be sure that they do not exist for other experiments. There is some evidence to suggest that men and women are more likely to code their location in an environment with different spatial cues (e.g., Dabbs, Chang, Strong, & Milun, 1998) and different neural networks (e.g., Grön, Wunderlich, Spitzer, Tomczak, & Riepe, 2000) . We must therefore exercise some caution when generalizing from the findings of those experiments with a predominantly female sample (i.e., Experiments 3 and 5). Future experiments could explicitly test these issues in more detail.
Foraging in natural environments involves many additional factors that are beyond the scope of the present series of experiments. This is especially true when navigating through novel surroundings. However, insomuch that individuals can use some form of spatial coding system to keep track of where they have been in a large-scale environment, the current studies elucidate how such coding could be achieved. This suggests that researchers should aim for a greater level of specificity when arguing that behaviors observed at one spatial scale can transpose to another. The cognitive representations of space, and relations within it, have been shown to dissociate between navigational and object-oriented tasks (e.g., Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999; Guariglia, Piccardi, Iaria, Nico, & Pizzamiglio, 2005; Maguire & Cipolotti, 1998) , and it is therefore not tenable to assume that the demands of a task will be equivalent across scales. Furthermore, the term foraging implies a great variety of concepts and should perhaps be replaced in debates such as this by nomenclature that describes the specific cognitive function being addressed. Here we have shown that probabilistic cuing can transpose to large-scale space, although the demands associated with a different spatial scale mean that the mechanisms are not necessarily equivalent to those observed in other settings. If we are to fully characterize human spatial function, we must comprehensively study behavior in a variety of tasks, contexts, and scales.
